Rajiva Wijesinha : Reforming the Judiciary in a civilized manner 
I  am sorry about the current attempt to impeach the Chief Justice, since  it seems to me rather like taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. What  makes it worse is that those responsible for the impeachment motion seem  to be going after the wrong nut.
Over the last year, in trying to expedite implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan,  I noted many problems arising from the failure of the judiciary to  establish norms with regard to the processes entrusted to them. 
I sent  several letters on this subject, to the Chief Justice as well as the  Judicial Services Commission, but initially received only dusty replies,  ie claims that the responsibility was not theirs.
Recently though – and this may  reflect the fact that the Judiciary realized it could not go on in an  ivory tower with no regard for basic human problems – I got more  positive answers, and most notably the assertion that advice had been  given to the magistracy with regard to rulings. However my subsequent  request, that that advice be made public, has been thus far ignored. I  am sorry about this, because the public has a right to know the norms  under which judgments and sentencing are imposed.
We had also, at meetings of the  Task Force on the Plan which I convene, suggested meetings to ensure  that magistrates were more careful about fulfilling their  responsibilities, not only with regard to sentencing, but also for  visiting prisons and remand homes. This happened rarely, though I should  also note the commitment of a few members of the judiciary who did take  such responsibilities seriously.
The  Secretary to the Ministry of Justice then wrote to the Judiciary asking  that a meeting be convened, but she did not get a response. I have  urged her to take the matter up again, but I can understand diffidence  if there seems to be no interest. That is why I brought the matter up  with the Presidential Secretariat, which now has responsibility for the  Attorney General’s Department and the Legal Draughtsman’s Department.  Unfortunately that initiative too did not find a response.
Underlying the problem is a  failure I think to understand two cardinal principles, and to maintain a  distinction between them. The judiciary must be independent, because  their primary responsibility is to the people and often the state is  involved in litigation. Whether with regard to criminal matters, or  constitutional matters, the judiciary has to decide between the  government and the people, and therefore it must remain independent of  the government with regard to the decisions it delivers.
However the judiciary has to  decide in accordance with the laws, and it is the business of  Parliament, not the judiciary, to make law. The judiciary may decide  that laws are in conflict with the Constitution but, unless this is the  case, the judiciary has no business to go against duly approved  legislature, simply on the grounds that it could have been better. And  it certainly should not ignore laws when they establish safeguards for  the people, such as limitations on the period for which people can be  remanded, or provisions for visiting places of detention.
It is possible that the  judiciary may realize, after laws have been in operation, that they  present problems, as for instance with the law about statutory rape.  Applying that in a case of obvious mutual consent, where the couple got  married when the age of majority was reached, seems unfair. But, as has  been pointed out by wise judges, there are ways to deal with such  problems, by introducing a suspended sentence subject to review by  Parliament of the legislation it had introduced.
One problem that we face is  that there is no proper provision for judicial review of legislation.  This also extends to judgments of the Courts that are blatantly absurd,  but the conservatism of the judiciary means that these are not changed.  Thus we have the anomaly of the former Chief Justice having ruled,  wrongly as I have argued, that the former President’s term of office  finished in 2005, whereas the present President, rightly, having been  elected for a second term in January 2010, only took his oaths ten  months later, in terms of the Constitution.
It was of course foolish for  the former President to have taken her oaths at the wrong time, and then  taken them secretly again later, which led to the ambiguity of which,  with his customary brilliance at proving whatever he wanted to prove,  the former Chief Justice took advantage. But it is absurd that we have  to live with two conflicting versions of what a particular section of  the Constitution means.
Given such problems, I believe  government should arrange a workshop with representation from the  judiciary, to work out how to entrench the independence of the different  branches of government whilst also strengthening accountability of all  of them, including the Judiciary, to the people. The accountability of  the Executive and the Legislature is based on elections, though I  believe we should introduce measures such as the Right to Information  and publication of the proceedings of parliamentary oversight, to  improve the process.
But, with regard to the  judiciary, where elections are not possible, there must be much stronger  insistence on transparency, along with better mechanisms for ensuring  consistency and adherence to established norms. This should also be  accompanied by more effective training programmes, with regard not only  to decision making but also the writing of judgments. Recently I was  deeply saddened to find that the Judiciary had turned down a programme  of training prepared by the Colombo University Centre for Human Rights,  which the previous Chief Justice had approved.
The present Chief Justice may  be diffident about the University, given her own background, but that  should not have stood in the way of better training for her peers.  Certainly her failure to do better in this and other respects should be  overcome; but through discussion, not impeachment