Of the three, the 75-year-old Wickremesinghe is the only one who can claim experience of running a government. But he appears least likely to win. He is literally alone in this race, with no party or political support to speak of. His United National Party (UNP) is close to extinction after its rout to nil seats in the 2020 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe’s presidency is propped up in Parliament by the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, the party of the reviled Rajapaksas. This association has made him even more unpopular. Plus he is taking the rap for conditions imposed by the IMF in return for its bailout package, negotiated on his watch, which have inflicted more economic pain.
Premadasa is far more popular than Wickremesinghe. He walked out of the UNP with several others in 2020 when he realised Wickremsinghe would never hand over the party leadership to him. His Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) or United People Power won more than 50 seats in Parliament, and is stronger than the parent party.
He won brownie points for not succumbing to the lure of the prime ministership or the presidency in 2022 when it became evident he would have to depend on the Rajapaksas to keep him in office. Premadasa has promised to renegotiate the IMF deal so that its conditions do not hurt the people. He is going all out to woo not just the majority Sinhalese voters, but also the Tamil and Muslim communities. He is the only candidate to mention in his manifesto the 13th Amendment, a provision in the Sri Lanka Constitution to share political power with Tamils, with the promise of its “full implementation”. This may hurt his campaign in the Sinhalese south, where devolution and federalism are bad words, much like Article 370 in India.
Dissanayake is said to be the strongest contender. He is seen by most young voters as the symbol of “system change”, the demand of the public uprising against the Rajapaksas. He was the first to call for renegotiating the IMF deal. The party’s formidable cadre-based grassroots mobilisation has been laying the groundwork for over three years. But for those old enough to have witnessed the JVP’s insurgencies in 1971 and from 1987-1990, the promise of Dissanayake is laced with memories of the violence of those years, and concerns about its political ideology.
The JVP, which began as a radical left organisation, was banned after its first attempt to take over the state. But the JVP rose up again in 1987 against the Sri Lanka state, this time as a Sinhala chauvinist force opposing the Indian intervention that led to political concessions to the Tamil minority in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, and the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in northern Sri Lanka. If “JVP times”, a reference to that period, still haunts Sri Lanka’s south, in the north, Tamils fear that Dissanayake may abolish the 13th Amendment.
India’s ties with Sri Lanka have survived multiple crises, including the continuing grievance of the Sinhalese majority against Delhi for its 1980s intervention, and training Tamil militants. In 2022, India stepped in again, but this intervention was different. Delhi provided a generous $4 billion aid to help Sri Lanka survive the economic meltdown, the only country to do so. The Rajapaksas had flaunted proximity to Beijing, but no help came from China. After this aid, many Indian projects in Sri Lanka, including long pending ones like the joint development of a huge oil tank farm strategically located in the eastern port town of Trincomalee, got off the ground. This in turn led to renewed public discourse on how India was extracting a quid pro quo for its assistance. A secret deal between an Adani company and President Rajapaksa in 2021 to set up a wind farm in northern Sri Lanka, did not help.
As President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s replacement, Wickremesinghe did not back off the projects. Rather, he proposed more, including “economic integration” and a land bridge with India. But as his re-election is uncertain, Delhi is reconciled to the probability of dealing with the unfamiliar.
Unlike in the Maldives, where India had no connect with the newly elected President, it made up for the less than sporadic engagement with the JVP, which has nursed a close relationship with China over the decades, by inviting Dissanayake to visit earlier this year. He held talks in Delhi, visited Anand in Gujarat, and travelled to Kerala. Dissanayaka has spoken of the reality of India, and of the necessity to engage with it for Sri Lanka’s economic development. If he wins, Delhi will be watching for signs of any special relationship with Beijing.
Delhi’s connect with Premadasa is better, despite the terrible history with his father, who clandestinely armed the LTTE to fight the IPKF. In public life since 1993, Premadasa was UNP leader-in-waiting long enough for Delhi to get to know him well. Since 2020, the SJB leader has also been Leader of the Opposition. Sri Lanka’s Tamil question impacts India politically. Delhi has time and again pressed the Sri Lankan leadership to implement the 13th Amendment in the Tamil north. Premadasa’s promise in this regard should be music to Indian ears.
In the past, the Tamil polity tried to make its vote count by rallying behind a single presidential candidate, who it believed it could negotiate with, to address its political aspirations. This time, the Tamil vote may fragment. The most influential Tamil party is split between Premadasa and a surprise “common Tamil candidate”, fielded by some sections of the Tamil polity. Younger Tamils may even vote for Dissanayake.
The fragmentation will limit Tamil influence. In any case, the Tamil question will not be a priority for the new President though an ongoing Human Rights Council session in Geneva will remind Colombo of unresolved post-war issues.
In fact, the new President may not be able to take up any issue until he has a new government. Among the three main candidates, none has the numbers in this Parliament to form a majority government without support of the Rajapaksas’ SLPP. Premadasa has some 50 MPs, Dissanayake has three, and Wickremesinghe none. The President is empowered to dissolve Parliament and call a fresh election. That too may yield no good answers. All said, the presidential election will not end Sri Lanka’s uncertainties.
