SLB Update: Impunity and Batalanda Commission Report

Sri Lanka Brief Update: Impunity and Batalanda Commission Report I 18 March 2025

Compiled by Sunanda Deshapriya.

1. Batalanda was an illegal detention center in Sri Lanka where torture and extrajudicial killings were inflicted on undocumented suspects of the JVP/DJV (People’s Liberation Front and its front organization, the Patriotic People’s Movement). These individuals were abducted by both official and unofficial armed groups.
2. Between 1988 and 1989, the JVP/DJV launched a violent armed campaign against the government and its political opponents, using terrorism as a strategy and killing thousands of civilians. In response, the government employed state terrorism, leading to the abduction and killing of tens of thousands of suspected JVP/DJV members.
3. In the presidential (September 2025) and parliamentary (November 2025) elections, the JVP and its front organization, the NPP (National People’s Power), came to power and now form the ruling government. Although the Batalanda Report has been in the public domain since 2000, the NPP government decided to take legal action on its findings only after the now-famous Al Jazeera Head to Head interview with former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, who was instrumental in establishing the Batalanda torture camp.
4. A few eyewitnesses /former detainees have now appeared on social media describing harrowing details of the Batalanda torture camp.
5. The report and the years of inaction on its recommendations stand as yet another example of Sri Lanka’s persistent impunity regarding serious crimes against humanity.
6. On September 21, 1995, President Chandrika Kumaratunga established the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, known as the Batalanda Commission, to investigate incidents of human rights violations, murders, and disappearances. Given the extensive scope of the investigation, a new warrant was issued on December 15, 1995.
7. The commission’s tenure was extended 12 times, and after nearly three years of evidence gathering, it submitted its report to President Kumaratunga on March 26, 1998. However, the recommendations outlined in the report were never implemented.
8. The commission was tasked with investigating five key issues, including whether the government unlawfully detained and tortured individuals at the Batalanda Housing Complex, owned by the State Fertilizer Corporation, between January 1, 1988, and December 31, 1990, and determining those responsible for these actions.
9. The commission comprised notable members such as Senior Superintendent of Police S.C. Pathirana, State Counsel Yasantha Kodagoda, President’s Counsel R.I. Obeysekara, Court of Appeal Judge D. Jayawickrama, High Court Judge N.E. Dissanayake, State Counsel Sarath Jayamanne, Deputy Inspector General of Police T.V. Sumanasekara, Superintendent of Police H.H.M.R. Premaratne, and others.
10. Public hearings commenced on January 16, 1996, and were held for 127 days at High Court No. 2 in the Aluthkade High Court Complex, Colombo. The commission questioned 82 witnesses, including prominent figures from the United National Party such as Ranil Wickremesinghe, Joseph Michael Perera, and John Amaratunga.
11. The commission produced a comprehensive report spanning 28 volumes and totaling 6,780 pages. It also identified specific houses within the Batalanda Housing Complex, situated in Biyagama within the Gampaha District, that were allegedly used for illegal detention and torture. This housing complex, consisting of 64 units, was categorized into A, B, and C based on size and facilities.
12. The report highlighted that Ranil Wickremesinghe, then Minister of Industries, had called Asoka Senanayake, the liquidator of the State Fertilizer Corporation, to request the allocation of houses from the Batalanda Housing Complex to police officers. Douglas Peiris, an Assistant Superintendent of Police, was identified as the officer who took possession of these houses on behalf of the Fertilizer Corporation. Notably, no formal agreements were signed during this process. Former Police Commissioner Ernest Perera testified that this appeared to be “a private transaction” involving Mr. Peiris, Corporation officials, and Minister Wickremesinghe.
13. The commission also questioned Ranil Wickremesinghe, who claimed that the arrangements were made at the request of former Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne. However, the commission dismissed this claim due to a lack of supporting documentation and testimony from relevant officials. The report concluded that Wickremesinghe was aware of the illegal activities taking place at House B2 and other properties.
14. Former Senior Superintendent of Police Nalin Delgoda testified that Wickremesinghe chaired meetings at the housing complex, providing “political leadership” to police officers despite not holding a defense portfolio. Delgoda admitted to following political orders, stating that he “had no other option.”
15. The commission criticized the informal nature of these meetings, highlighting the absence of official records. It ultimately concluded that the discussions held at the housing complex were likely illegal.
16. The English report of the Batalanda Commission (pages 119–122) identified individuals directly and indirectly responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment of detainees at the Batalanda Housing Scheme between January 1, 1988, and December 31, 1990:
17. Since 1986, then-Minister of Industries Ranil Wickremesinghe had directed the Fertilizer Corporation to allocate houses in the Batalanda Housing Scheme to police officers. As a result, ASP Douglas Peiris acquired up to 13 houses under these orders.
18. Wickremesinghe’s directive constituted an abuse of ministerial power.
19. Senior Superintendent of Police Nalin Delgoda knowingly allowed the unlawful acquisition of these houses, violating Police Department regulations. He deliberately refrained from intervening in illegal activities.
20. Delgoda also misused his authority by organizing police meetings at the Batalanda Housing Scheme under Wickremesinghe’s leadership.
21. Wickremesinghe interfered with police operations and legal enforcement, ultimately facilitating the establishment of illegal detention centers within the allocated houses.
22. The report presents a complex web of arrests, detentions, disappearances, and mysterious deaths, seemingly intended to cover up atrocities related to the Batalanda Camp:
23. Tudor Perera, the brother of a prominent supporter of Ranil Wickremesinghe, Gonawala Sunil, was arrested and forcibly disappeared on February 9, 1990 (Pg. 76, English version).
24. Rohitha Priyadarshana, the officer in charge of the Sapugaskanda Police Station at the time of the attack, disappeared while on his way to attend a police conference in February 1990. His murder is suspected to have been carried out by a group linked to Ranil Wickremesinghe. His body was found on February 23, 1990 (Pg. 113, English version).
25. Kaduruwahandige Jinadas, also known as “Jine,” who had provided a false statement implicating Rohitha Priyadarshana, disappeared while in custody (Pg. 107, English version).
26. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s housekeeper died unexpectedly the day before he was scheduled to testify before the Commission. He had previously given a confidential statement implicating Wickremesinghe in acts of torture and killings. Reports suggest he had a personal relationship with Wickremesinghe (Pg. 63, English version).
27. The Presidential Commission’s report primarily recommends granting the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to impose penalties, such as the deprivation of civil rights, on individuals who have repeatedly violated fundamental rights. This is outlined on pages 124 and 125 of the English-language report.
28. The report highlights that certain executive representatives have persistently violated fundamental rights without facing timely or appropriate consequences. To address this, it also suggests forming a committee to amend the Criminal Procedure Code, enabling courts to investigate illegal activities on-site.
29. Given that law enforcement officers were often responsible for such violations, the report emphasizes safeguarding complainants from intimidation. Additionally, it recommends directing the Inspector General of Police to investigate all complaints submitted to the commission.
30. To read the report in English: Batalanda Commission report in Full

The End.