In Greek mythology, the Hydra of Lerna was a monstrous, multi-headed serpent. When one head is cut off, several more would grow in its place. Defeating the creature required more than striking at the heads that appeared; it demanded confronting the source of the monster’s power. The NPP government’s proposed repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979 (PTA), is analogous a modern version of this myth. After decades of criticism over arbitrary detention, police confessions, sweeping executive powers and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, the Government came into power with a pledge to replace the PTA with a new legal framework.
However, in the wake of the proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTA), Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill (POCB) and Prevention of Foreign Terrorist Fighters Bill (FTF Bill) you can unveil an unsettling pattern: powers removed from one legislative proposal appear to re-emerge, in altered forms, in another. The Government with its promise of dismantling the legal architecture that made the PTA so dangerous is cutting off one statutory head while allowing others to grow in its place.
From One Law to Three
The PTA has long been criticised for enabling prolonged detention, admitting police confessions under exceptional evidentiary rules and exposing journalists, activists and minority communities to abuse. Replacing it should mean eliminating these dangers as opposed to relocating them. The PSTA, gazetted in September 2026 is a legislative reform that should be read alongside its contemporaries the POCB and the FTF Bill. Laws, despite being located in separate bill provisions must be read together because a person’s civic rights may depend not only on the conduct alleged but also on the statute under which the authorities choose to investigate.
Removed from the PSTA, revived in the POCB
Sections 16 – 18 of the PTA establish exceptional rules governing confessions to senior police officers and disapply important protection that a confession made to a police officer cannot be proved against an accused person set out in Section 25 under the Evidence Ordinance. Sections 56–58 of the PSTA do not reproduce the PTA’s special rule against evidence law admitting confessions made to senior police officers. Instead, PSTA establishes procedures for statements made before a Magistrate, including medical examination and video-recording safeguards. However, sections 46–52 of the POCB reintroduces a comparable evidentiary regime. In particular, section 47 provides for the admissibility of specified signed statements made to senior police officers, while section 46 disapplies provisions of the Evidence Ordinance.
Akin to the Hydra, when the Government proposes to remove a draconian feature of the PTA from its counter-terrorism regime, its relocates and preserves a similar mechanism in the organized crime framework.
A Different Law, a Familiar Danger
Section 9 of the PTA permits detention under executive orders, allowing liberty to be restricted outside the ordinary process of judicially supervised remand. Sections 27–29 of the PSTA introduces a more structured regime, including a one-year remand limit and High Court involvement in extending detention orders. Nevertheless, executive detention remains, and the Bill retains extensive powers to restrict liberty without ordinary judicial authorisation at the outset.
The POCB through sections 20-21 establish another route to exceptional custody. Section 20 permits up to 72 hours before production before a Magistrate, while Section 21 empowers the Secretary to the ministry responsible for the police to issue a detention order for up to one year. The POCB does not replicate the PSTA’s full set of oversight safeguards, including its Independent Review Committee and Human Rights Commission visiting arrangements.
The exceptional detention model is not abolished after all, but is extended into a more palatable “organized-crime” investigations. The Government is yet to explain the need for such extraordinary and why ordinary judicial safeguards are insufficient.
Powers Deleted from One Draft, Restored Elsewhere
The December 2025 draft of the PSTA included provisions on interception and decryption, service-provider data and bank information. These provisions were omitted from the gazetted PSTA following objections, including concerns raised by UN Special Procedures (OL LKA 1/2026, 9
February 2026). However, sections 44-45 of the POCB reintroduces extensive surveillance powers.
For instance, section 45 addresses interception and decryption, while Section 44 provides for access to service-provider information, including specified call and location data without a court order under section 44(4).
This is a clear example of why the PSTA cannot be assessed alone. Deleting a provision critiqued for enforcing surveillance from one Bill is not meaningful reform if substantially comparable powers remain available under another with fewer safeguards. Intrusive access to communications and location data must be necessary, proportionate and subject to effective independent authorisation
and oversight.
Arrest, Search and Military Powers
The PTA had granted broad investigative powers that have persistently raised concerns about arbitrary arrests. Sections 19 -24 of the PSTA retain extensive search and arrest powers, including powers for members of the armed forces and Coast Guard in specified circumstances. Although the proposed framework introduces procedural requirements, the expansion of military involvement in civilian law enforcement remains a serious concern.
The POCB also establishes a parallel set of coercive powers related to search, arrest and detention for organised-crime investigations. It is noteworthy that these provisions do not operate in isolation but interact with, and operate alongside, the ordinary criminal procedure framework. If these bills are enforced as laws, the danger lies in a combined effect, where exceptional powers become available across different legal categories. However, the protections, however limited they maybe, attached to one legislative framework are not available in another. Organised crime: When Association Becomes Evidence
The POCB’s reach extends beyond conventional organised criminal activity. Under section 3,serious crime generally includes offences punishable by four years’ imprisonment or more, while the First Schedule adds specified offences irrespective of that general threshold. Section 66 defines an organised criminal group as a structured group of three or more persons, without requiring formally defined roles. Section 4(2) permits characteristics such as dress, tattoos, hand signs, language and association to be considered in determining membership. These provisions can cast an excessively wide net. Informal groups, online associations and people connected by ordinary social or political activity could face suspicion if the statutory criteria are applied broadly. The concern is especially acute where exceptional detention, surveillance and evidentiary powers follow from the classification. A law against organised crime must target demonstrable criminal conduct, not allow appearance or association to substitute for proof.
Free Expression, Journalism and the FTF Bill
Sections 9 -11 of the PSTA raise concerns about offences relating to possession and publications considered useful for terrorism, despite some exceptions and improvements over the PTA. Its provisions concerning confidential information and reporting restrictions also warrant scrutiny. Sections 14, 56 and 65 of the POCB introduce further concerns, including restrictions on reporting court proceedings without due permission, a tipping-off offence and broad informa tion-disclosure duties. The absence of explicit protections for journalists could discourage reporting on criminalinvestigations and alleged State abuses.
Meanwhile, section 5 of the FTF Bill refers to procedures in the PTA concerning investigation, arrest and bail. If the PTA is repealed while this reference remains, the Government must clarify how those procedures are intended to operate. If not, it risks preserving the PTA’s procedural reach through incorporation by reference.
Finally, section 73 of the PSTA preserves the PTA’s application to pending and past cases. Repealing the PTA will not automatically remove its consequences for those who will be caught between this transitional provision.
The Hydra Revives
The persistence of exceptional powers also raises a question of political legitimacy. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony draws attention to how state authority is sustained not through coercion alone, but also through the production of consent and the presentation of particular
arrangements as necessary or legitimate. Security legislation is often justified through the language of public protection, national security and the prevention of serious crime. These objectives are important, but their invocation should not remove the burden on the State to demonstrate why extraordinary powers are necessary. A change in the statutory label from terrorism to organised crime, for example – may alter how a power is publicly understood without necessarily changing its effects on individual liberty. Whether this occurs in the present legislative proposals requires close scrutiny of their provisions and safeguards.
One can argue that the Government deserves credit for provisions in the PSTA that seemingly improve on the PTA. However, reform cannot be measured by examining one Bill in isolation. The POCB revives comparable confession rules, introduces extensive surveillance powers and creates a parallel detention framework. The FTF Bill imports PTA procedures, and the PSTA preserves the old law’s application to certain existing cases. In light of the Hydra analogy, if the Government cuts away the PTA but allows its most dangerous powers to regenerate across the PSTA, POCB and FTF Bill, the public will have witnessed not the defeat of the monster, but its multiplication. The real test
of whether a draconian law is repealed lies not only in merely cutting off one head, which is replaced by many in its place.