Submission On the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PTSA) 2026

Ministry of Justice,

No. 19, Sri Sangaraja Mawatha,
Colombo 10,
Sri Lanka

 Submission On the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PTSA) 2026

Submitted to: Ministry of Justice, Sri Lanka

From:  Sunanda Deshapriya, W.M./Sri Lanka Brief

Email: [email protected]

Home address: 365/1C, Batakatiya Rd, Udumulla, Muleriyawa.

Date: 15.01 2026

1. Introduction

This submission provides a human‑rights‑based analysis of the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PTSA) 2026, with reference to Sri Lanka’s obligations under:

• the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
• the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
• the UN Global Counter‑Terrorism Strategy
• the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter‑Terrorism and Human Rights
• the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
• the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of hatred

Sri Lanka is legally bound to ensure that counter‑terrorism legislation is precise, necessary, proportionate, and consistent with fundamental rights.

While the PTSA introduces procedural safeguards absent in the PTA, it retains core structural features that enabled decades of human rights violations. This submission outlines key concerns and proposes amendments to ensure compliance with international standards.

2. Definition of Terrorism

2.1 Concerns

• The PTSA definition includes vague concepts such as “propagating war,” “violating sovereignty,” and “serious obstruction” of electronic systems.
• These terms lack precision and may capture non‑violent political activity, digital activism, or civil disobedience.
• Although protests and strikes are excluded “by themselves,” the wording leaves room for criminalisation of protest‑related incidents.

2.2 International Standards

• ICCPR Article 15 requires clear, precise, and foreseeable criminal offences.
• UN Special Rapporteur guidance states terrorism must be limited to acts intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians.
• The UN Security Council (Resolution 1566) defines terrorism narrowly.

2.3 Recommendation

• Amend the definition to align with the UN 1566 definition and remove vague political concepts.
• Ensure that only violent acts or intent to cause serious harm to fall within the scope of terrorism.

3. Arrest, Detention, and Executive Powers

3.1 Concerns

• The PTSA allows the Minister to issue Detention Orders for up to 8 weeks.
• Arrest and search powers extend to the armed forces and coast guard, blurring the line between military and policing functions.
• “Reasonable suspicion” is undefined, enabling arbitrary arrest.

3.2 International Standards

• ICCPR Article 9 requires prompt judicial oversight, not executive detention.
• UN Human Rights Committee: detention must be “exceptional, necessary, and strictly proportionate.”
• UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force: military involvement in policing must be exceptional and time‑bound.

3.3 Recommendations

• Transfer detention authority from the Minister to a judge.
• Limit arrest powers to civilian police.
• Define “reasonable suspicion” in line with international jurisprudence.

4. Torture Prevention and Safeguards

4.1 Concerns

• Although the PTSA includes forensic medical examinations and HRCSL access,
  statements made in coercive environments may still be admissible.
• Early‑stage access to lawyers may be restricted in practice.

4.2 International Standards

• CAT prohibits torture absolutely.
• ICCPR Article 7: no evidence obtained through torture may be used in proceedings.
• UN Special Rapporteur: early access to counsel is a critical safeguard.

4.3 Recommendations

• Explicitly prohibit the use of any statement obtained through torture or ill‑treatment.
• Guarantee immediate and unimpeded access to legal counsel from the moment of arrest.
• Require audio‑visual recording of all interrogations.

5. Freedom of Expression and Publications

5.1 Concerns

• The PTSA criminalises “encouragement of terrorism” on an intention, knowledge, or recklessness standard.
• “Terrorist publications” include materials that could be “understood” as encouraging terrorism.
• Possession alone may constitute an offence.

5.2 International Standards

• ICCPR Article 19 protects freedom of expression.
• Rabat Plan of Action: only direct incitement to violence may be criminalised.
• Johannesburg Principles: national security restrictions must be necessary and proportionate.

5.3 Recommendations

• Remove the recklessness standard.
• Limit criminalisation to direct and intentional incitement to violence.
• Protect journalists, researchers, and archivists from liability for possession of materials.

6. Freedom of Association and Proscription

6.1 Concerns

• Section 6 criminalises a wide range of conduct related to proscribed organisations, including:
  membership, leadership, donations, symbols, meetings, and “espousing the cause.”
• These offences apply inside and outside Sri Lanka, affecting diaspora communities.

6.2 International Standards

• ICCPR Article 22 protects freedom of association.
• Restrictions must be necessary, proportionate, and linked to violent conduct.
• UN Special Rapporteur: proscription must be subject to independent judicial review.

6.3 Recommendations

• Limit offences to material support for violent acts.
• Remove criminalisation of symbols, meetings, and ideological expression.
• Establish an independent review mechanism for proscription decisions.

7. Surveillance, Privacy, and Access to Data

7.1 Concerns

• PTSA allows access to bank, telecom, and government data, and unlocking encrypted data.
• Proceedings may be ex parte and in camera, limiting transparency.

7.2 International Standards

• ICCPR Article 17 protects privacy.
• UN High Commissioner: surveillance must be lawful, necessary, proportionate, and subject to independent oversight.

7.3 Recommendations

• Require strict judicial warrants for all data access.
• Introduce independent oversight of surveillance powers.
• Ensure transparency and periodic reporting to Parliament.

8. Oversight and Accountability

8.1 Concerns

• Oversight mechanisms exist but remain executive‑dominated.
• No independent counter‑terrorism review body.
• Victims lack effective remedies.

8.2 International Standards

• UN Global Counter‑Terrorism Strategy: oversight must be independent, impartial, and effective.
• ICCPR Article 2: states must provide effective remedies for rights violations.

8.3 Recommendations

• Establish an independent oversight commission with access to all detention facilities.
• Require annual parliamentary review of PTSA implementation.
• Strengthen remedies for victims of unlawful detention or torture.

9. Conclusion

The PTSA 2026 introduces procedural improvements compared to the PTA, but it does not amount to genuine reform.
It retains the PTA’s core structure:

• broad definitions,
• executive detention,
• military policing,
• criminalisation of speech and association,
• and expansive surveillance powers.

To comply with Sri Lanka’s obligations under the ICCPR, CAT, and UN counter‑terrorism standards, the PTSA must be substantially amended to ensure that counter‑terrorism measures are narrow, rights‑respecting, and grounded in judicial oversight.

Sri Lanka has an opportunity to enact a modern counter‑terrorism law that protects national security without undermining fundamental freedoms. This requires a shift from executive‑driven security to rights‑based, rule‑of‑law‑centred governance.

The End.

Submitted on 15 January 2026 by E Mail.