Image: National People’s Power leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in the red shirt, attends a protest rally in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Feb. 26, 2023 (AP photo by Eranga Jayawardena)./WPA
(WPR)On Sept. 21, Sri Lanka will hold its first presidential election since the July 2022 popular uprising known as the Aragalaya, which drove then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa from power. In the two years since then, Rajapaksa’s successor, current President Ranil Wickremesinghe, has managed to enact some policy reforms that unlocked much-needed relief from the International Monetary Fund, allowing the country to regain some political and economic stability.
Nevertheless, recent polls suggest that Anura Kumara Dissanayake, a longtime opposition figure and leader of the People’s Liberation Front, or JVP, is set to be the frontrunner in the upcoming presidential election. Traditionally a Marxist-Leninist party, the JVP has evolved from a fringe faction known for its revolutionary past into a prominent anti-establishment force. It is now the leading formation in the National People’s Power, or NPP, political alliance, which itself has surged in Sri Lanka’s post-Aragalaya political scene. What explains Dissanayake’s rise, and what does his ascent signal for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy orientation?
The NPP’s Post-Aragalaya Ascendance
The JVP is notorious for its history of violent political insurgency. Established in the 1960s as a Marxist-Leninist party, it led armed uprisings against the Sri Lankan government in the early 1970s and late 1980s, before transitioning into a viable electoral party in the mid-1990s. It gained prominence in the early 2000s as the principal political force opposing the Norwegian-mediated peace process between the then-government and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE.
Although the party was briefly part of a coalition government led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, or SLFP, in the early 2000s, it has largely remained part of the opposition since then, adopting strong stances against privatization of state-owned industries and what it characterizes as the neoliberal economic policies of successive Sri Lankan governments. Starting in 2019, the JVP has been a driving force in the NPP coalition, which consists of 20 other political groups. The coalition pledges to usher in “a new era of social justice” and cultivate an “uncorrupted, accountable and transparent political culture,” while advocating for increased state involvement in education, health care and the provision of social security.
Though the NPP has struggled in the past to gain traction among voters, winning just under 4 percent of the vote in the 2020 general elections, the alliance has fortuitously become the primary beneficiary of the anti-establishment sentiment that swept Sri Lanka during the Aragalaya protests two years ago. It is now attracting large crowds in the current campaign, raising Dissanayake’s profile in the process. Widespread public discontent over corruption, economic hardships and nepotism among the ruling elite provided potent fuel for the public mobilization that overthrew Rajapaksa. The subsequent election of Wickremesinghe by Parliament, perceived by some as a continuation of the Rajapaksa family’s grip on power, engendered a sense of betrayal among those who saw the Aragalaya as a step toward “system change.” The NPP successfully capitalized on this mass discontent, presenting itself as “the agent of change” in a landscape where the political legitimacy of mainstream parties has been undermined.
The NPP proposes to streamline governance by limiting the Cabinet to 25 ministers, eliminating the roles of state ministers and creating Expert Advisory Boards within each ministry to enhance decision-making. This approach has struck a chord with voters frustrated by the inefficiencies of a bloated government structure. The coalition’s strong stance on combating corruption and recovering state assets that were embezzled under previous governments has also resonated with those disillusioned by the apparent failure of mainstream political parties to address these pressing issues effectively.
Interestingly, the JVP has softened its hard-line stance on certain issues, such as re-nationalizing privatized industries and limiting the influx of foreign capital. Similarly, one of the JVP’s core political tenets has historically been opposition to New Delhi’s influence in Sri Lanka, which it characterizes as Indian expansionism. That has now been replaced by Dissanayake’s recent declaration that “India is our closest neighbor and major political economic center, so when we take political economic decisions, we must always be careful about the impact they will have on India.”
This softened stance was on prominent display during a recent visit by Dissanayake to India, when he tempered the JVP’s earlier opposition to the government’s plans to sell state-run dairy companies and farms to the Amul Milk Corporation, indicating his openness to a collaboration with the Indian company. This shift toward more moderate positions suggests that the NPP is trying to balance the JVP’s ideological roots with the practical realities of governance. By the same token, however, this could lead to internal divisions within the NPP coalition over time.
Remaining Hurdles
The NPP appears poised to challenge Sri Lanka’s political status quo due to public disillusionment with mainstream politicians from the SLFP, the United National Party, or UNP—headed by Wickremesinghe, the current president—and the United People’s Power party, or SJB. That is coupled with a growing appetite for an overhaul of the existing parliament. As a result, although members of the SJB have espoused a sound set of economic reforms and Wickremesinghe’s short tenure has witnessed the stabilization of Sri Lanka’s economy after the 2022 default, the NPP continues to poll ahead of its rivals.
Concerns remain over the NPP’s desire to renegotiate Sri Lanka’s agreement with the IMF using an entirely new Debt Sustainability Analysis. Critics argue that the NPP’s proposals may lead to the cancellation of the existing IMF program, which has so far helped stabilize the economy. The NPP has also had to deal with allegations raised about the past participation of some JVP members in historical insurrections and the crimes they committed at the time.
The emergence of a somewhat pro-China leader in the Maldives has also heightened security concerns in New Delhi, prompting India to hedge its bets by strengthening ties with actors across Sri Lanka’s political spectrum, including the JVP. Although the rise of a coalition spearheaded by a Marxist-Leninist leader might give the appearance of a diplomatic win for China, this is hardly the case. The JVP has historically positioned itself as a nationalist political force in Sri Lanka, rather than being explicitly pro-China or aligned with any specific foreign power. The party has also been critical of China’s growing footprint in Colombo’s Port City special economic zone. And as noted earlier, Dissanayake has acknowledged that Sri Lanka must take New Delhi’s sensibilities into account when making major political and economic decisions.
In sum, while the NPP’s pragmatic adjustments on issues such as foreign capital and relations with India suggest a more centrist and strategic approach, questions remain about its economic policies, particularly its stance on the IMF agreement. Whether the new direction the NPP professes to take will lead to lasting political transformation in Sri Lanka remains to be seen, even if Dissanayake ends up as the country’s next president. But the NPP’s rise undeniably signals a critical moment in the country’s ongoing struggle for effective and transparent governance.
Shakthi De Silva is a nonresident Vasey Fellow at Pacific Forum International and a visiting lecturer at the Royal Institute of Colombo, the Defence Services Command and Staff College, the Sir John Kotelawala Defence University and the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, where he teaches courses on international relations. He previously served as a lecturer at the University of Colombo and as a researcher attached to the Sri Lankan Defense Ministry’s and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ think tanks.