Sri Lanka Brief Update- Cyclone Ditwah: Key Facts and Lessons Learned

Compiled by Sunanda Deshapriya.

1. This briefing note provides an overview of Cyclone Ditwah, summarising its impact, the response measures taken, key lessons learned, and the governance weaknesses identified, with the aim of minimising the adverse effects of similar events in the future.
2. The Cyclone Ditwah struck Sri Lanka on 26-30 December 2025, marking one of the most severe weather events since the 2024 Boxing Day Tsunami. Classified as a Category 4 cyclone, it caused widespread disruption to infrastructure, livelihoods, and essential services. The event highlighted vulnerabilities in disaster management systems and underscored the need for improved resilience planning.
3. The cyclone reached peak sustained winds of about 65–75 km/h (40–45 mph) when it made landfall and during its strongest phase over Sri Lanka. It was classified as a Cyclonic Storm under the India Meteorological Department
4. Many regions recorded 300–400 mm (11.8–15.7 inches) within 24 hours.
5. Hydrologists estimate nearly 13 billion cubic metres of water fell in a single day (28 November), equivalent to about 10% of Sri Lanka’s annual rainfall. In total, the cyclone and its associated weather system affected Sri Lanka for about 7 days, with the most intense impacts between 27–29 November.
6. A total of 576,626 families and 2,054,535 individuals were affected, with 627 deaths and 190 missing persons reported; 4,517houses were destroyed, and 76,066 were partially damaged, while 956 relief centres are active, sheltering 27,663 families and 89,857 individuals. (DMC report on 07.12.2025) UNICEF Sri Lanka reported that over 275,000 children have been affected by Cyclone Ditwah, worsening existing hardships as poverty in the country has doubled since 2019, leaving millions struggling to meet basic needs.
7. While the Government delayed decisive action, communities stepped in to help by organising humanitarian efforts—collecting rations, running community kitchens, and offering free medical and transport services.
8. Authorities failed to communicate critical information in all three national languages as required by policy, with Tamil-language updates arriving much later than Sinhala and English. Tamil-speaking communities missed out on critical updates, including detailed landslide warnings from the NBRO, real-time road closure alerts, and examination-related logistics such as air delivery of exam papers to Jaffna. Additionally, river-basin warnings, maritime advisories, and granular wind forecasts were either delayed or absent in Tamil.
9. Cyclone Ditwah has caused an estimated economic loss of US $6–7 billion, which is more than three times the damage from the 2004 tsunami, officially valued at US $1.5–2 billion, according to the Commissioner General of Essential Services. This figure is a preliminary estimate, and a comprehensive post-disaster assessment will follow to guide the economic recovery plan.
10. The government announced a sweeping relief package for Cyclone Ditwah victims, including Rs. 50,000 for household essentials, Rs. 25,000 per month for rent for up to six months, Rs. 25,000–50,000 monthly aid for families that lost homes and jobs, up to Rs. 5 million for landless families or those in unsafe areas, Rs. 5 million to rebuild fully destroyed houses, up to Rs. 2.5 million for repairs, and Rs. 25,000 for cleaning homes.
11. The government has not released the total estimated cost for the entire compensation package for the victims of Cyclone Dithwa. Minister of Public Security informed Parliament that Rs. 10 billion has been allocated to provide cash compensation to all individuals affected by the disaster. it is estimated that the total recovery and reconstruction costs from the disaster could reach up to US$7 billion.
12. The World Bank will conduct a rapid post-disaster assessment, while development partners emphasised the need for a comprehensive Post-Disaster Needs/Damage Assessment to quantify losses in housing, infrastructure, agriculture, and services, enabling mobilisation of funds for medium- and long-term recovery. The UN is leading the development of a Joint Rapid Needs Assessment in close coordination with the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) and humanitarian partners following the devastating Cyclone Ditwah in Sri Lanka.
13. Sri Lanka has requested around $200 million in financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund to address the devastation caused by Cyclone Ditwah. The IMF stated it remains closely engaged with Sri Lankan authorities and is committed to supporting urgent recovery, rebuilding efforts, and strengthening future resilience.
14. The Meteorology Department, the National Disaster Management Council, the Disaster Management Centre (DMC), the National Disaster Relief Services Centre and the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO) all come under the Ministry of Defence, headed by the President. All four institutes are crucial for forecasting potential natural disasters, issuing early warnings, and providing relief when such disasters occur.  There was no proper coordination among them at the time of the disaster.
15. According to officials the DMC has a 15-method early warning communication system which includes a 32 Million (the total number of DMC-recognised, active SIMs in Sri Lanka) SMS alert system, direct comms with each tri-force camp, the police, a network-style communication platform with all 14,000 Divisional Secretariats, and 25 District Secretariats as well as 30,000 other key contacts which include provincial media correspondents. No SMS alerts were posted.
16. The Radio Society of Sri Lanka (RSSL) and the Amateur Radio Civil Services Network (ARCSN) became the vital communication backbone when conventional systems failed during Cyclone Ditwah. Using their own equipment and expertise, they kept the Disaster Management Centre, TRCSL, and local authorities connected across multiple affected districts. Despite severe flooding, power outages, and infrastructure breakdowns, operators deployed within hours from makeshift setups, vehicles, and remote field stations, maintaining resilient HF and VHF emergency channels when almost nothing else was functioning.
17. The government announced a statutory fund called ‘Rebuilding Sri Lanka’, to be managed under the Presidential Secretariat. However, concerns have arisen over its composition: seven of the nine members are from the corporate sector, all male, with no civil society representation, and four previously served on a similar committee under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa during the COVID-19 crisis. Since all public finances, including special funds, require parliamentary oversight, ensuring broader representation from the state sector is both prudent and necessary.
18. The government’s failure to convene the Disaster Management Council (DMC) early—despite its legal mandate and critical role in coordinating emergency responses—was a major lapse. The council had not met for seven years until August 2025, and its absence during the crisis likely led to delays, mixed messaging, and fragmented decision-making, according to Javid Yusuf, a former diplomat, Attorney at Law and columnist.
19. Government agencies failed to act decisively despite early forecasts of heavy rainfall, issuing late and ineffective warnings between 25 and 28 November. A State of Emergency and essential services were declared only after midnight on 28 November, exposing serious governance failures. Timely measures could have prevented the breakdown in coordination, raising critical questions about why local and district-level systems collapsed during the November 2025 climate emergency (-Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, Attorney at Law and columnist )
20. Sri Lanka lacked advanced disaster preparedness despite having an institutional framework created after the 2004 tsunami, including the Disaster Management Act, National Disaster Management Council, and Disaster Management Centre. The Council, legally required to meet quarterly, convened only 14 times in 20 years instead of the expected 80, leaving national-level coordination weak. (Sunil Kannangara, Former District Secretary/ Aniddda Weekly.)
21. The impending cyclonic weather was available at least by 23, 24 and 25November 2025. The India Meteorological Department (IMD), which operates the Regional Specialised Meteorological Centre serving countries including Sri Lanka, first predicted a depression on 13 November and warned of possible cyclogenesis on 20 November. From 23 November onwards, IMD issued three-hourly and six-hourly updates indicating the system’s development around 26 November, and all this information was routinely shared with Sri Lankan authorities.
22. On 25 November, BBC weather reported that Sri Lanka may receive 300-500 mm of rain in the coming days. A professor of geography at Jaffna University wrote that 25-29^th will have heavy rain and wind, and on 25, he mentioned for the first time that he cyclone will be named Ditwah. The Sri Lanka Meteorological Department warned two weeks before the possibility of forming a cyclone east of Sri Lanka.
23. President Anura Kumara Dissanayaka retains direct oversight of all departments responsible for managing natural disasters. He has acknowledged that the disaster-management mechanisms were not functioning properly when the Ditwah Cyclone made landfall. Although he was required to convene the National Disaster Council regularly, he did not fulfil this obligation. It also remains unclear whether the National Security Council met consistently or reviewed the available warnings about the impending disaster.
24. Following the Easter Sunday Attacks in 2019, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka clearly affirmed the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure the safety and well-being of the people. In the coming months, the handling of the Ditwah Cyclone and the accountability of political leaders and state officials will likely become a central public issue.