- The Government of Sri Lanka is considering a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of superior court judges by two years, alongside parallel extensions for judges in lower courts. The Cabinet of Ministers approved a proposal to raise the retirement age of judges on 27 July 2026
- Although the proposal is presented as an administrative measure to retain experienced judges and reduce case backlogs, it has triggered significant concern among legal professionals, judicial associations, and constitutional scholars.
- The Government argues that extending judicial tenure will increase judicial capacity and help clear long‑standing delays. Senior judges possess deep institutional memory and experience in constitutional and appellate matters. Retaining them is seen as beneficial for jurisprudential continuity. Extending retirement ages is framed as a faster solution than recruiting and training new judges. The Government notes that many jurisdictions have raised judicial retirement ages in line with demographic trends.
- Former chair of the BASL Saliya Peries PC argues that the proposal is not merely a technical adjustment but a move with far‑reaching consequences for judicial independence and constitutional governance.
- Sri Lanka’s Constitution places judicial retirement ages within the chapter safeguarding judicial independence, alongside provisions on appointments, removals, salaries, and pensions; under these constitutional limits, Supreme Court judges retire at 65, Court of Appeal judges at 63, High Court judges at 61, and District and Magistrates’ Court judges at 60, and the Government’s proposal to extend each category by two years would therefore require a constitutional amendment for the superior courts.
- Sri Lanka’s legal community has unanimously rejected the Government’s plan to raise judicial retirement ages, with more than 3,000 lawyers at a Bar Association of Sri Lanka L Special General Meeting on 29 July 2026 voting against the proposal. The Bar Association’s President, Rajeev Amarasuriya, said the move threatens judicial independence and described it as “extremely unwise, and the vote gives the BASL a clear mandate to oppose the proposal and warned that weakening judicial independence would have long‑term consequences.
- The Judicial Service Association of Sri Lanka (JSA), which represents District Judges and Magistrates across the country has also unanimously opposed the measure, demonstrating strong internal resistance within the judiciary. Peries notes that this opposition reflects the JSA’s long‑standing commitment to the rule of law and judicial independence.
- JSA opposed extending judges’ retirement age on the ground that it freezes promotions for lower-court officers for nearly two years. This stagnation blocks career progression to the High Court, severely damaging judicial morale and discouraging top legal talent from entering the profession. Furthermore, altering retirement limits mid-service risks public perception of political favoritism toward specific incumbent judges. By keeping senior judges in office longer, the government inadvertently disrupts the judicial ecosystem, compromises the independence of the bench, and creates systemic bottlenecks that stall the advancement of dedicated, long-serving career magistrates.
- The Sri Lankan government advocates extending judges’ retirement age primarily to address a crisis of over 1.1 million pending cases. Officials argue that retaining highly experienced legal minds at peak efficiency is vital to clear this staggering backlog and prevent standard transition delays during new appointments. Furthermore, the country faces severe personnel shortages, operating with only 20 judges per million people. Aligning with international benchmarks and modern life expectancy justifies keeping capable jurists active. This reform aims to stabilize court operations, maximize existing institutional expertise, and structurally fortify a heavily strained judicial system without disrupting daily trial schedules.
- Increasing retirement ages will not remedy court delays, which stem from structural issues like outdated procedures, insufficient support staff, forensic analysis delays, and weak case management systems. Extending tenure without addressing these systemic problems is unlikely to produce meaningful improvement argues Saliya Peiris PC.
- The proposal dubbed the “Surasena Amendment” has drawn criticism for allegedly targeting an extension of Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena’s tenure just before mandatory retirement, with opponents viewing it as a tailored measure to retain a specific judge rather than a broader systemic reform. While this naming underscores concerns regarding executive interference and personalized legislation, the administration denies these claims, maintaining the two-year extension applies universally to the judiciary to address severe personnel shortages and legal backlogs.
- Proposed judicial policy options include limiting retirement‑age changes to future appointees, integrating any adjustments with broader modernization efforts such as digital, forensic, and administrative upgrades, or retaining current age limits while prioritizing vacancy filling and infrastructure improvements. Together, these approaches offer different pathways for managing judicial tenure, ranging from modest, incremental revisions to more comprehensive institutional reform.
- The proposal to extend the retirement age of superior court judges is not a neutral administrative adjustment. It carries deep constitutional and political implications, risks undermining judicial independence, and may damage the legacy of the current administration. While the Government’s rationale reflects genuine concerns about backlogs and capacity, the absence of consultation, the retroactive application to sitting judges, and the potential for political misuse make the proposal highly contentious. A prudent path forward would require transparent consultation, prospective application, and integration into a broader judicial‑reform strategy that addresses structural causes of delay rather than relying on tenure extensions alone.
Compiled by Sunanda Deshapriya
30 July 2026. Geneva. Switzerland.