

Briefing Notes

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EASTER SUNDAY ATTACKS IN SRI LANKA: ACCOUNTABILITY, JUSTICE, AND THE DEEP STATE

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ABBREVIATIONS

CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CNI	Chief of National Intelligence
COI	Presidential Commission of Inquiry, Final Report, Vol. 1
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
DMI	Directorate of Military Intelligence
ICM	Intelligence Coordinating Meeting
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IGP	Inspector General of Police
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PSC	Parliamentary Select Committee to look into and report to Parliament on the Terrorist Attacks
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
MP	Member of Parliament
NSC	National Security Council
NTJ	National Thowheed Jama'ath
SIS	State Intelligence Service
SSP	Senior Superintendent of Police
TID	Terrorism Investigation Division

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INTRODUCTION

On April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday, Islamic extremist suicide bombers attacked three Christian churches and three upmarket hotels in Sri Lanka. The bombings killed and injured hundreds.

Nearly three years later, delays in investigations and harassment of those seeking answers have led injured survivors, families of the dead, the Catholic Church, and the Human Rights community to believe the truth behind the bombings is being covered up.

The government is resorting to selective justice. Recommendations of the COI and PSC are ignored. The senior police officer, central to the intelligence failure has been promoted and made a state witness in the court cases related to the attacks.

The COI and the PSC reports conclude, then President Maithripala Sirisena was aware of the impending attacks. Questions are asked why he was out of the country at that time, and why he obstructed security measures taken after the attacks.

Investigations point to unexplained links between military intelligence units, some of the suicide bombers and other suspects, and questions remain regarding the motive for the serious intelligence failure, paving an unobstructed path for extremists to execute their plans.

Was the intelligence failure a genuine slip up by senior police officers or deliberate, with political mileage in mind? Did the Deep State facilitate, through neglect or otherwise, the Easter Sunday attacks?

While the perpetrators enjoy impunity, there is a growing trend by authorities to undermine successful investigations into crimes against humanity. Those seeking justice and calling for independent, transparent investigations are harassed, resulting in activists seeking the support of the global human rights community.

This report presents verifiable information on the bombings and events leading to it, with the expectation it would bring justice to all those affected.

FACT BOX: EASTER SUNDAY ATTACKS IN SRI LANKA

Date of Attack: 21 April 2019

Targets: 3 churches in Negombo, Batticaloa and Colombo, bombed during the Easter Sunday morning service, and 3 luxury hotels i.e., Shangri-La, Cinnamon Grand, Kingsbury, all in Colombo, while guests were at breakfast

Mode of Attack: Suicide bombing by 8 Islamic extremists, followers of the ISIS ideology.

Number of Victims: 267 killed, including at least 45 children and 40 foreign nationals. Over 400 injured

Number of detained: Over 300 Muslims were arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). An unknown number are still in custody.

Legal Action Taken: Three cases were filed by the Attorney General. 1. Against the then Inspector General of Police, Pujith Jayasundara for criminal negligence 2. Against then Defence Secretary, Hemasiri Fernando for criminal negligence¹ 3. Against 25 Muslims for conspiring to murder, aiding, and abetting, collecting arms and ammunition and attempted murder². Of these, the accused in the first two were acquitted on February 18, 2021. The other is ongoing. All three cases were taken up by a threemember special High Court appointed under the PTA.

On December 11, 2020, a case was filed in the U.S. District Court, Los Angeles against three Sri Lankan citizens for terrorism offenses, including conspiring to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (ISIS) and for the 2019 Easter attacks in Sri Lanka.⁴

Committees and Commissions appointed:

1. President Maithripala Sirisena appointed a three-member Ad Hoc committee on April 22 to probe the bombings and identify root causes and related matters. Report presented on June 10, 2019,⁵ never made public.
2. "Select Committee of Parliament to look into and report to Parliament on the Terrorist Attacks" appointed on May 22, 2019. Final report presented to parliament on October 29, 2019, available on parliament website.⁶
3. "The Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into and Report or Take necessary Action on Bomb Attacks on 21 April" appointed by President Sirisena on September 22, 2019. Final report handed over to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on February 1, 2021.⁷ Only first volume of the 2000-page, 6 volume report made public. As pressure mounts on 22 February the full report was submitted to the parliament.
4. President Rajapaksa appoints a six-member cabinet sub-committee on February 19, 2021, to study facts and recommendations and course of action given in final report of Presidential Commission of Inquiry, and the Sectoral Oversight Committee on National Security. The sub-committee report presented to the President on April 5, 2021, has not been made public.
5. A presidential task force to speed up investigations by the police Criminal Investigation Department (CID), headed by Chief of National Intelligence, Major General Jagath Alwis, and comprising Director, State Intelligence Service, Director General-Military Intelligence, Deputy Inspector General-Criminal Investigation Department, Director-Counter Terrorism and Investigation Division and Director Legal-Sri Lanka Police was appointed, however no report or information on this Task Force is available.



*Justice for the dead and accountability for the crime still elusive.
(Image credit Freddy Gamage)*



THE CONTEXT

During the 30-year war Sri Lanka governments employed Muslim paramilitary formations to gather intelligence. They were paid from a secret fund administered by the Defence Ministry. The size of the fund, established during British rule, is not known nor is it audited. It has different components; “Commander’s Secret Fund”, falling under Army Commander, and the State Intelligence Services Fund.

Keheliya Rambukwella, a leading Minister in the current regime, admitted during a TV talk show their government paid Zaharan Hashim and others for gathering intelligence.

Several Commonwealth countries, including the United Kingdom have introduced changes to similar funds for clandestine operations making those transparent and accountable.

Zaharan Hashim, responsible for planning and executing the Easter Sunday attacks had been actively preaching extremists ideas since 2006 and formed the National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ) around then.

The danger he posed had been brought to the notice of the State by several Muslim organisations and leading figures in the community. Zaharan had been under an arrest warrant since 2018 but evaded the police.

Soon after the war ended in 2009, a campaign of malinformation against Muslims began and intensified after 2015, leading to mistrust of that community. The fear mongering was led by extremist Sinhala-nationalist monks, groups, and the media. The common factor amongst them is their partiality to Mahinda Rajapaksa led political formations.

In 2018 President Maithripala Sirisena staged a constitutional coup and appointed Opposition Leader Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime Minister. After 52 days it was declared illegal by the Supreme Court.

One reason to justify the coup and remove Ranil Wickremasinghe as Prime Minister was the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Sirisena and former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

Sirisena accused Wickremasinghe of covering up and not investigating the conspiracy.

The assassination allegations were made by one Namal Kumara, an Army deserter who submitted forged certificates to the Army. A rabid Sinhala Buddhist nationalist, he had at one time worked at the Presidential Secretariat.

His allegations led to the arrest of Nalaka Silva, DIG, Director, Counter Terrorism Division, who was investigating Zaharan Hashim, and had obtained an arrest warrant against the latter.

But the assassination theory was a flop, no investigation report was produced, and Namal Kumara disappeared from the political scene.

When the coup was declared illegal, President Sirisena ordered that PM Wickremasinghe and the Deputy Defence Minister be kept out of National Security Council meetings. Instead, he invited MPs of the Opposition to the meetings.

When the Easter attacks happened, Sirisena was handling national security like his personal fiefdom.



Campaigns for justice and accountability have been on going for almost 3 years.

IMPORTANT EVENTS LEADING TO THE EASTER SUNDAY ATTACK

APRIL 2018: SIS BECOMES SOLE INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY ON ZAHARAN HASHIM

In a letter dated April 8, 2018, Director SIS, DIG Nilantha Jayawardena requested the IGP to halt investigations conducted by TID, stating they were prejudicial to investigations of the SIS. The IGP complied. (PSC report page 133). The letter to the IGP was sent a year before the Easter bombings, resulting in the SIS being the sole group investigating Zaharan. (PSC report page 2)

MAY 2018: SHANTHIPURA TRAINING CAMP, NUWARA ELIYA

Twenty men, dressed in Arab attire arrived at Taxila Holiday Resort, Nuwara Eliya on May 5, 2018, and stayed for two days. Their presence raised suspicions in a neighbour, Tillekeratne Illesinghe, who heard them discuss ‘transport weapons and money.’

Illesinghe contacted the police with much difficulty and informed SSP Mahinda Dissanayake, Nuwara Eliya police about the men. Though the police promised to send an investigative team at 8.30 a.m., the mobile patrol car arrived only at 4.30 p.m. Just before it arrived, three vehicles had left.

Was there a deliberate attempt by someone in the police to cover up activities at the Resort?

The police team found gold and one million rupees cash in a bag, and gold jewellery in a laptop bag. Though Zaharan’s wife, Hadiya told the COI that a pistol was hidden in that bag, police only took the jewellery. Despite the discovery of so much gold and money, the police had not made an entry in the logbook.

Soon after the Easter Sunday Attacks, OIC Nuwara Eliya police, Indrajit visited Illesinghe, advising him



against speaking about the incident. The OIC had shown him a photo of Zaharan and Illesinghe had confirmed seeing him at the Resort.

Though the police unit of the COI had recorded a statement from OIC Indrajit, the COI was unable to talk to him, as he died of a heart attack about two weeks after the statement was taken. (COI report Page 150-51).

NOVEMBER 30, 2019: ATTACK ON VAVUNATHIVU POLICE POST AND COVER UP

Unknown assailants shot dead two police constables manning a check point at Vavunathivu on November 30, 2018. The SIS, headed by DIG Nilantha Jayawardena produced five reports on the incident identifying two former members of the LTTE, Kadiramathambi Iraja Kumaran and Rasanaygam Sarvananthan as the perpetrators. The two were arrested. Police also produced a jacket, alleged to have been found near the murder site. Police dogs had led investigators to main suspect, Kadiramathambi Iraja Kumaran's home.

Following the Easter Sunday bombings, investigating officers found evidence linking Zaharan Hashim's group to the Vavunathivu killings. The story about the jacket had been created to shield the real assassins. Five days after the Easter Sunday attack, the T 56 machine gun used to kill the two policeman was found; bullet casings at the murder scene matched the gun, which carried the number, T 56-28050884.

Another matter involving a firearm bearing number T 56-28050884 came to light; An automatic rifle bearing number T 56-28050884 had been issued to the Eravur police during the war, and then given to Home Guard Vallathambi Abdul Razak, a Muslim. He had disappeared with the rifle sometime in 2008 but reappeared 10 days later and handed in the T 56 bearing same number. On examination, the Government Analyst found the number on this gun had been forged. (Government analyst report number CE 109/2009). Such forgeries can be done only with sophisticated machinery.

A case, number 226/2008 was filed against Razak in the Batticaloa Magistrate Court regarding his disappearance with a firearm. It was referred to the High Court under case number 2959/2014. However, on April 3, 2017, Razak was freed, when the case was dropped over an alleged technical issue.

Following the Easter Sunday bombings, Razak was rearrested and questioned about the original rifle and how it fell into the hands of Zaharan Hashim's group. According to his statement, he had given the T 56 to a Muslim group working with the Military. LankaeNews⁸ reported that an SSP submitted a report on it to IGP in January 2022. No denial has been issued so far.

Why the attack was covered up, and how the T 56 rifle given to a Muslim group working with the Military in 2008 wound up with Zaharan in 2019 is mired in mystery.

Another concern is current President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who held no office at the time, telling SGID Ravi Seneviratne, that ex-LTTE cadres were not involved in the killings. Seneviratne had made an entry of this information, and the story was confirmed in the Mawbima, a Sinhala language newspaper.

Another concern is current President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who held no office at the time, telling SGID Ravi Seneviratne, that ex-LTTE cadres were not involved in the killings. Seneviratne had made an entry of this information, and the story was confirmed in the Mawbima, a Sinhala language newspaper.

How did Gotabaya Rajapaksa come to this conclusion, when SIS and intelligence units of the tri-forces held the ex-LTTE members responsible? He has never been questioned on the matter by any investigative body.

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DECEMBER 23, 2019: ATTACK ON MAWANELLA BUDDHA STATUES

Between December 23 and 26, 2018, Buddha statues around Mawanella were damaged. The CID investigated and nine persons were arrested. Examination of their phone calls indicated their last contact had been with someone in the Puttalam area. While the mastermind behind the vandalism was not identified at the time, it was later discovered that Zaharan Hasheem had instigated it.

However, during an undercover operation on January 16, 2019, to identify the Puttalam contact, the CID team stumbled upon a training camp in Wanathavilluwa. The CID team operated under SSP Shani Abeysekera.

C. Wickramasekara, an Assistant Superintendent of Police with the CID at the time, submitted a detailed report on the investigation to the IGP in late 2019.

JANUARY 16, 2019: DISCOVERY AT THE WANTHAVILLUWA TRAINING CAMP

“On February 2, 2019 Senior DIG, CID Ravi Seneviratne and its Director, SSP Shani Abeysekera called on President Sirisena to request a date to meet with the NSC to update it on the training camp, the storage of weapons and the Zaharan group. Sirisena never provided an opportunity.”

CID officers discovered a large cache of arms at the camp. Suspects arrested at the Lacto Estate training camp divulged crucial information about Zaharan’s plans. Officers learnt for the first time that the camp had been set up to train two types of suicide and assault teams. It was clear to investigating officers that Zaharan’s group was planning and was capable of assault and bomb attacks. If not for this timely discovery, the explosives Zaharan had access to, could have resulted in a much larger carnage.

The Commission of Inquiry report contains more information of ideological and armed training camps held by the group.

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on President Sirisena to request a date to meet with the NSC to update it on the training camp, the storage of weapons and the Zaharan group. Though he promised a date, that never materialised.⁹

MARCH 29, 2019: RAZIK MOHAMED TASLIM SHOT IN THE HEAD

Coordinating Secretary of a government minister, Mohamed Razik Mohamed Taslim was the first to divulge information about who vandalised the Mawanella Buddha statues.

He was shot in the head, while asleep at home in Danagama, Mawanella on March 29, 2019. Suspicion that Zaharan was behind the shooting was later confirmed. Taslim continues to be under medical treatment.



A DRY RUN: REMOTE CONTROLLED MOTOR BIKE EXPLOSION

On April 16, five days before the bombings, a motorcycle was blown up using a remote-control device in Kattankudi, Zaharan's home base, in Eastern Sri Lanka. SIS learnt of the incident a day later.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM AN INDIAN COUNTERPART

NO 01. On April 4, 2019: SIS Director, DIG Nilantha Jayawardena received intelligence information via Whatsapp from an Indian counterpart, and reads, according to the COI report:

1. "As per an input, Sri Lanka based Zahran Hashmi of National Towheed Jamaat and his associates are planning to carry out suicide terror attack in Sri Lanka shortly. They are planning to target some important churches. It is further learned that they have conducted the reconnaissance of the Indian High Commission, Sri Lanka and it is one of the targets for the planned attack." (Page No. 156)
2. "The input indicates that the terrorist may adopt any of the following modes of attack. Suicide attack. Weapon attack. Knife attack. Truck attack."
3. "It is also learnt that the following are the likely team members of the planned suicide terror attack. Zahran Hashmi, Jal Al Quithal, Rilwan, Sajid Moulavi, Shahid, Milan and others. The input may kindly be inquired into on priority and the feedback given to us." (COI Page 157.)

No 02: April 05, 2019: A second Indian intelligence counterpart confirmed to SIS Director, the information sent a day earlier. (COI Page 159)

No 03: April 17/18, 2019: SIS Director asked the Indian counterpart for more information about the motorcycle blast. Here is the response received on 20 April at 4.12 PM (Date and time is given in the High court judgement on former IGP Pujith Jayasundara)¹⁰

"As per reliable input Zaharan Hashim of National Towheed Jamaat of Sri Lanka and his associates have hatched a plan to carry out Isthisahad (suicide) attack in Sri Lanka. It is further learnt that they have conducted a dry run and caused a blast with explosive laden motor bicycle at Palmunai near Kattankudi in Sri Lanka on 16.04 2019 as part of the plan. It is learnt that they are likely to carry out their Isthisahad (suicide) attack in Sri Lanka at any time on or before 21.04 2019. They have reportedly selected 8 places including a church, and a hotel where Indians inhabit in large number. Further details awaited." (COI Report Page 175/76)

No 04. April 20, 2019: On April 20, SIS Director received another intelligence report from the first Indian counterpart:

"Hi, I am forwarding an input received from Headquarters regarding a threat from Zaharan Hasheem Hashmi on Indian interest in Sri Lanka before 21st of April 2019. A similar report had been passed on by us a couple of weeks back. The difference is that this stand the input indicates the timeframe and says a dry run has been carried out in Kathankudi. May please see for necessary action and feedback. HQ also wanted to know feedback the early input if any regards. (COI Page 159)

"In his own admission SISI director Nilantha Jayawardena knew by March 2019 that Saharan Hasheem and his group has capacity to launch a violent/armed attack. Strange enough he did not consider above sited information as serious information.

How can a head of State Intelligence Service come to such a decision alone? Shouldn't he, as head of State Intelligence should have consulted other intelligence agencies before making such a decision?"

Why didn't he put 1+1 together?

Considering the evidence of SIS Director Nilantha Jayawardena, Commission of Inquiry concludes that he has not sent any feedback to Indian counterparts.

No 05. April 21, 2019: On April 21, 2019, at 8.27 a.m., the day of the attack, Director SIS received the last intelligence information on the planned attack.

“Sir one of the targets is Methodist Church, Colombo.

“Respected Sir, Good Morning. They are likely to operate between 0600 hrs and 10 hours today.

Further details awaited. For kind information, sir.” (Page 178 COI report)

“SIS director Nilantha Jayawardena in his evidence against former IGP Pujith Jayasundara stated that only after he received the information on 20 April 4.12 pm, he decided the earlier information as definite intelligence information. High Court judgement stated that SIS director has failed to find a definite intelligence information in time.”

(Judgement of the High Court case number HC (TAB) 2900/ 2021 delivered on 2022.02.18)



RECOMMENDATION BY PSC AND COI

The Parliamentary Select Committee and the Commission of Inquiry, both appointed to examine the events leading to the Easter attacks conclude, that if the Indian intelligence reports had been acted on, the bombings on April 21, 2019, could have been avoided. Both reports make wide ranging recommendations too.

This section deals mainly with recommendations relating to accountability. The report is limited to three important personalities: former President Maithripala Sirisena, former SIS Director, DIG Nilantha Jayawardena and Head of Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force), Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero.

ON FORMER PRESIDENT SIRISENA

PSC Observations and Recommendations regarding President Sirisena

Considering evidence before it, the PSC found that several individuals failed to prevent the Easter Sunday attacks. The PSC recommends that indictments and prosecutions be initiated in the event sufficient evidence is collected to demonstrate fault.

When the attacks took place, President Sirisena was overseeing national security and had excluded the Prime Minister from those meetings.

On the day of the attack, President Sirisena was in Singapore on an unscheduled visit.

The PSC notes that President Sirisena “failed to appoint an acting Minister for Defence when he left Sri Lanka on April 16, which exacerbated the confusion and uncertainty soon after the attacks.”

He also did not return to the country immediately, though the presence of the President during a national emergency is critical; He is the Commander in Chief, Head of Government, and has the power to call out the security forces and declare emergency.

The PSC notes it is ‘deeply disappointed’ that the President deliberately misled it, and in this light also questions the veracity of his other statements.” It gives two instances of discrepancies.

One was when he said he did not have intelligence information before the attacks though media reports state he was briefed on April 11, 2019 (ten days before the bombings). “The other is his claim of the unavailability of seats on flights from Singapore to Colombo on 21st April 2019 which has been countered by evidence of ample seats being available on three flights on the day.” (PSC pages 140 -145).

The PSC notes that evidence from others showed that the Director, SIS, communicated regularly and directly with the President. A privilege the Director’s superiors and other colleagues did not enjoy. The President in his statements to the PSC also confirmed this. “This was the assumption regarding the intelligence

Former President Sirisena

- Banned PM and IGP from the NSC after his constitutional coup failed.
- Did not allow chief of the CID, SDIG to brief NSC on crucial information on Zaharan’s armed & bomb making activities
- Did not appoint a deputy defence minister when he left the country days before the attacks
- Soon after the attack, from Singapore ordered security chiefs not to attend the meeting convened by the PM
- Did not use the airline facilities to come back to the country in earliest opportunity
- Oppose the appointment of PSC; ordered security chiefs not to give evidence at the PSC
- Offered former IGP an ambassadorial post if he takes the responsibility for the attacks and resign
- Did not apologise for the Easter Sunday attacks
- Lied to COI

information received prior to the Easter Sunday attacks. Whilst the Director, SIS insisted he had not briefed the President of the intelligence information received, the PSC finds it hard to believe that this was the case considering the regular conversations between the two parties.” (PSC Page 131)

Note: President Sirisena opposed the appointment of the PSC though Parliament passed it without division. He ordered Heads of State investigative units to refrain from appearing before the PSC, and Director Centre of National Intelligence, DIG Sisira Mendis was sacked for ignoring his order. ”

After the alleged plot to assassinate President Sirisena in 2018 was revealed, he had ordered that the IGP be left out of NSC meetings. The alleged plot and the arrest and subsequent release of the then Director, TID need further investigation. Following the arrest, TID investigations into Zaharan and associates were halted and later abandoned.

COI OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT SIRISENA

The COI on page 248 states that after assuming duties as President and Minister of Defence, President Sirisena did not hold regular meetings of the NSC. March 2019 is one such example, when no meeting was held, while at other times it was once or twice a month.

“COI observes that on a balance of probability Nilantha Jayawardena, Director SIS, did convey the intelligence received by him to President Sirisena between 4th and 16th of April 2019”

The COI too noted that President Sirisena has been untruthful; while he told the commission that he learnt about Zaharan’s activities and ideologies only in January 2019, there were many prior instances when he had been informed about it, evidence that the Commission presented to Sirisena when he appeared before it. The COI notes in fact that he would have known about Zaharan’s activities at least from November 2016. (Page 257)

“Having observed the very close connection on the evidence between President Sirisena and Nilantha Jayawardena, Director SIS, COI observes that on a

balance of probability Nilantha Jayawardena, Director SIS, did convey the intelligence received by him to President Sirisena between 4th and 16th of April 2019.”

The report adds, “Based on the evidence COI is of the view that there’s a criminal liability on his part for the acts of omissions explained above. The COI recommends that the Attorney General consider instituting criminal proceedings against President Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code.” (COI 265)



ON FORMER SIS DIRECTOR NILANTHA JAYAWARDENA

PSC Observations and Recommendations on SIS Director Nilantha Jayawardena

Despite the dry run in Kattankudy on April 16, 2019, and intelligence information available of the potential bombings, the Director, SIS neglected to inform DIG, Eastern Province, nor ask others if the relevant security personnel of the area should be informed. (Zion Church, Batticaloa, Eastern Province was a target.)

The PSC also notes that though the Director, SIS is a lead in the intelligence apparatus, educated and resident in Colombo, he had no idea where the Methodist Church in Colombo was. Nor did the Secretary Defence. The Church is a landmark at Kollupitiya junction, and very close to Temple Trees.

The two leading intelligence gathering entities in the country are the SIS and the DMI. The SIS gathers information from external sources, and was duty bound to share information received on April 4, 2019, with DMI. The Director, SIS also failed to share reports received after the April 16, 2019, explosion until April 19, 2019, a key failure on his part.

The PSC notes several instances since 2018 of the SIS failing in its duty to share information in its position with relevant intelligence groups. This negligence cost the lives of hundreds, injured many for life, and caused immeasurable devastation to the country.

These observations were made in the light of attempts made to shield the culpability of key individuals and the need to hold them responsible without further delay.

The Director SIS bears the greatest responsibility for the intelligence failure which led to the Easter Sunday carnage.

COI Observations and Recommendations on Nilantha Jayawardena

According to evidence, Director, SIS Jayawardena had sent reports and made representations on Islamic extremism to the NSC and ICM since 2016.

However, the COI was not convinced by some of the content presented. The presentations were on Power-Point on the Director's laptop, and the COI decided to have the machine subject to forensic examination. The report of the examination showed that at some point, some of the files had been altered.

While his actions indicate he failed to give due weightage to evidence received on April 4, 2019. (COI Page 287) The report notes that according to evidence discussed, the Director, SIS had not taken the information seriously and states, "Based on the evidence, the COI is of the view that there is a criminal liability on his part for the acts or omissions explained in the report. The COI recommends that the Attorney General consider instituting criminal proceedings against SDIG Jayawardena under any suitable provision in the penal code." (COI page 288)

The COI also named several high-ranking police officers the Attorney General should consider criminal proceeding or disciplinary action: CNI Director, DIG Sisira Mendis, SDIG Nandana Munasinghe, Western Province (Pg. 312), DIG Deshabandu Thennakoon, Colombo North (Pg.312), SP Sanjeeva Bandara, Colombo North Division (Pg.313), SSP Chandana Athukorala, SP B.P.I. Prasanna, Director Western Province Intelligence Division (Pg.316), ASP Sisila Kumara (Pg.317), CI M. Sarath Kumarasinghe, Acting OIC, Fort (Pg.318), CI M.Sagara Wilegoda Liyanage, OIC, Fort (Pg.321), IP Chaminda Nawaratne, OIC, Katana (Pg.323).

No action has been taken against any of these officers.

“Based on the evidence, the COI is of the view that there is a criminal liability on his part for the acts or omissions explained in the report. The COI recommends that the Attorney General consider instituting criminal proceedings against SDIG Jayawardena under any suitable provision in the penal code.”

ON GALAGODA ATHTHE GNANASARA THERO

COI report on Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero

Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero is the Secretary of the Bodu Bala Sena, established in 2012.


The Thero who was serving a jail term for contempt of court was pardoned by President Sirisena in May 2019, and in October 2021 President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, appointed him Chairperson of the “Presidential Task Force for One Country, One Law.”

While recognising the efforts of the Thero to identify the threat posed by Wahabism, the COI notes, his inflammatory speeches and actions pushed Muslim youth to embrace Zaharan’s ideology. “In the final video made by Zaharan spelling out the reasons for the attack, reference is made to actions of Venerable Galagoda Aththe Gnanassara Thero.”

It adds, “The COI has heard some of the derogatory remarks made by Venerable Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero on 17 February 2013 at Maharagama and at Aluthgama, on the day after the full moon day in June 2014.”

The COI recommends that the Attorney General consider whether criminal proceedings can be instituted against Rev. Gnanasara Thero in terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Act Number 56 of 2007 for the speeches made on 17 February 2013 at Maharagama and at Aluthgama, on the day after the Full moon day June 2014.”

The COI believes the BBS is a threat to religious harmony and should be proscribed. (COI Page 331)



Caption Gnanasara Thero with his bodyguards (file photo)

However, the Thero who was serving a jail term for contempt of court was pardoned by President Sirisena in May 2019, and in October 2021 President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, appointed him Chairperson of the “Presidential Task Force for One Country, One Law.”



FURTHER CONCERNS ON FORMER SIS DIRECTOR NILANTHA JAYAWARDENA'S ROLE

SIS Director Jayawardene was the only person to receive advance notice about the impending attacks. However, he argued at the COI that the first two messages were not intelligence information, but mere information. But the COI reports are clear that when information on who, what, where, when why and how is included, it becomes intelligence information.

SIS Director's evidence in the case of parliamentarian N.Raviraj murder case

In the murder case of TNA Parliamentarian Nadaraja Raviraj (November 10, 2006) SIS Director Jayawardene, gave evidence on behalf of the defendants and against the AG's department. The hearings began on September 7, 2016, in the presence of a Sinhala speaking jury.

He gave evidence against the main witness of the State, Liyanarachige Abeyaratne an ex- constable of the SIS. Abeyaratne told the court that former Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa was aware of the murder attempt on former MP Nadaraja Raviraj and arranged a payment of Rs. 50 million to the Karuna faction.¹² Jayawardene gave evidence without informing or obtaining clearance from the AG's department or his superiors, and his testimony was crucial in the Jury's decision to release the defendants.

Attorney at Law M.A. Sumanthiran appearing for the affected party asked for 5 minutes to cross-examine Jayawardena to disprove him, but court did not allow it.

The Attorney-at-Law who appeared for Jayawardena cross-examined former CID Director Shani Abeysekera at the COI and asked him if he was aware of the evidence given by Jayawardena on behalf of the defendants in the Nadaraja Raviraj murder case. The lawyer stated that Jayawardena had given that evidence in connection with an incident involving the then Defence Secretary, current President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.¹³ No action was taken against SIS Director for violating established protocols.

President Sirisena appointed Ad-Hoc committee absolving Jayawardena

"The ad hoc Committee, which has named several other officials, and which claims to have recorded the lapses on the part of the Director, SIS, could not have with any justification left his name out of the list of those responsible. One could legitimately ask the question whether this was an attempt to shield the person who, on the face of the available evidence, is most at fault for inaction that resulted in this unprecedented attack."

"The PSC is surprised that the ad hoc Committee, while detailing the shortcomings of the Director, SIS, thought it fit NOT to include his name in their recommendations on the persons against whom action should be taken for failures. The PSC categorically rejects the excuses given by Justice Hon. Malalgoda, Chairman of the ad hoc Committee in this respect and wonders if this was a design to shield the official, who in the opinion of the PSC, is the person most responsible for inaction that resulted in this unprecedented attack." (PSC Report Page 133)

"The ad hoc Committee could not have with any justification left his name out of the list of those responsible. PSC wonders if this was a design to shield the official, who is the person most responsible for inaction that resulted in this unprecedented attack."

COI Rejected Nilantha Jayawardena's Claim on India

Director SIS, Jayawardena was the only witness to imply involvement of a foreign hand in the bombings. He told the COI that an Indian named Abu Hind, may have triggered the attack, and that Indian intelligence agencies that provided information to him between April 4 and 21, 2019 may have had a hand in the bombings. (COI Page 218)

However, the COI provided a lengthy argument against accepting his theory. (Page 218-223). The question then arises, as to whom he is shielding.

“When Nilantha Jayawardena was asked to hand over his phone to the investigators, he deleted all the information stored there. That deletion shows that there was something to hide. It is a suppression of evidence. That offense alone was enough to name him a suspect.” –

Lakshman Kiriella, MP.
(Hansard 23 Nov 2021 column 43)

Missing Link: Nilantha Jayawardena Smart Phone Data

Director SIS, Jayawardena told investigators that he had deleted all data in his smart phone, so he could give the phone to his wife. The phone had been put back to factory settings, so forensics was unable to retrieve any material pertaining to the intelligence information he received from India, nor his communication with President Sirisena or anyone else.

Why would a senior police officer delete crucial information connected to the bombings? Could he not afford a new phone for his wife? If he wanted to give her the phone, why did he not back up the information, knowing how vital it is to the investigation? During the hearings, the COI also found he had meddled with the information contained in his laptop.

Nilantha Jayawardena kept crucial information hidden.

“SDIG SIS Nilantha Jayawardena, has sent a report to the CID for the first time providing full details of the NTJ command structure and evidence of their involvement in the killings of the two Police Constables in Vavunathivu a few hours after the Easter Attacks. The CID has been searching for M.C.M. Saharan [Zaharan is spelled as Saharan too] for the past four months with no support from the Intelligence Services and if this specific information related to the NTJ Command structure and the murder of the two constables in Vavunathivu were made available to CID or provided to the Security Council prior to the attacks by the then SDIG SIS Nilantha Jayawardena it may have been possible to prevent the attacks.” (From the fundamental rights petition filed by Former Director of the CID, SSP Sharni Abeysekara at the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka¹⁴)

All these information poses one of the crucial questions in relation to Easter Sunday Attacks in Sri Lanka: Was SIS Director knowingly allowed the attacks to happen and was there a coverup plan from the beginning?



ALLEGED LINKS BETWEEN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXTREMIST GROUP

Many questions regarding the role of military intelligence in the Easter attacks remain unanswered.

Extremists were trained by former paramilitary members

Several Muslim youths were recruited as military agents owing to their proficiency in Tamil during the war years. Hayathu Mahammamdu Ahamadu Mihan, currently in custody was recruited in 2007. He received physical and firearms training. Later it transpired he trained Zaharan's group at 12 or 13 camps. (COI Page 207)

Another who worked with Zaharan was Ahamed Lebbe Mohamed Niyas. He too became a military intelligence agent the same time as Mihan. He maintained two web sites and operated as an independent journalist while working for the military. Niyas joined Zaharan in 2018 and died in a shoot-out when a safe house in Saindamaradu was raided, after the Easter bombings.

While the Army maintains a widespread intelligence network in the Eastern Province including Kattankudy, and reports regularly to the DMI, there is no indication whether they monitor their former agents.

Abdul Lathif Jameel Mohammed and Military Intelligence

Jameel's target was the Taj Samudra Hotel in Colombo. However, for reasons unknown, he failed to explode the bomb at the hotel, but later detonated himself at a Guest House just outside Colombo.

"Jameel sits on a chair in the restaurant around 8.51 a.m. and takes the backpack he is wearing into his lap and begins to check the outside. Shortly thereafter there appears to be an incoming call on his phone. It is not clear what type of call or who the caller is. But the COI observed that the call came after Jameel started checking on his backpack." (COI Page 190).

In Colombo, Negombo and in Batticaloa bombs were exploded between 8.45 - 9.03 a.m. The DMI Officers have told the COI that they reached Jameel's house soon after the explosions in Colombo and suburbs. (COI Page 195).

Why was the Military trying to reach Jameel urgently? He was the only person who did not explode the bomb at the intended place.

"Military Intelligence officers [within hours of the attacks] have firstly visited Jamil's mother's house in Wellampitiya to find the whereabouts of Jamil, and after that proceeded to the house of Jamil in Dematagoda before the blast in Tropical Inn occurred, without ever informing the CID who were engaged in the investigation of M.C.M. Saharan and NTJ at the time being. In the said circumstances, it can be reasonably inferred that despite repeated requests by the CID for assistance in locating M.C.M. Saharan, military officers attached to

Armed training for Easter attackers was given by war time Muslim paramilitary members of the SL army. The DMI, which runs the widest spy network in the East, didn't keep a track of its former employees?

How come within hours of the attacks, officers of the DMI were able to visit the house of the only suicide attacker who didn't detonate the bomb?

Why didn't they share the information of him with the premier investigation agency, CID before the attacks?

DMI had prior knowledge of Abdul Lathif Jamil's identity, his role in the NTJ and his whereabouts, but for reasons yet unknown they have decided not to share this information with the CID to help apprehend Saharan and dismantle the NTJ." (From the fundamental rights petition filed by Former Director of the CID, SSP Sharni Abeysekara at the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka¹⁵)

Though many parliamentarians have asked questions, no answers are forthcoming.

Intelligence Officer Code Named Sonic Sonic

The ISIS did not accept responsibility for the bombings right away.

An intelligence officer called "Sonic-Sonic" goes to see someone called Podi Zaharan from Matale. He asks little Zaharan "why hasn't Al-Bagdadi not accepted responsibility for these attacks?" He answers: "Still the oath has not been publicized." Then there is a call to Indonesia. It is after this call the video was uploaded. It is after that uploading, that Al-Bagdadi accepts responsibility for the attacks." (MP Manusha Nanayakkara, The Hansard, 20th April 2021, Volume 282, Chapter 12, p. 1678- 1679).

Why did a SIS officer, who seems to have infiltrated into the extremist network, requested Podi Zararan to facilitate the ISIS accepting the responsibility for the Easter Sunday attacks? Why was CID not allowed to question him?

"The investigations conducted after the Easter Attacks the CID was able to find out about a person called "Podi Saharan" alias Matale Saharan who lived in Matale, who had connections with NTJ. He was arrested by arrested by the CID. While he was being interrogated by the CID it was transpired that he had communicated with a person called "Sonic Sonic". Thereafter the CID was able to locate the mobile sim of the said "Sonic Sonic" and locate him as one Sub Inspector Bandara.

"The CID proceeded to interrogate said SI Bandara and at that time DIG SIS Sampath Liyanage contacted the CID Director and informed him to not to proceed with the said interrogation as the involve-

ment of SI Bandara with Podi Saharan is a part of covert operation which is directly connected to the national security." (CID Director's FR petition to SC, mentioned above)

The question is why SIS didn't share any information received through their officer "Sonic Sonic" with the CID which was the main agency investigating the easter Sunday attacks. Why did SIS officer wanted Podi Saharan to call ISIS and take the responsibility?

Military Intelligence Operator among the Extremists.

A sim card of a smart phone was found at a Sainthamaruthu safe house raided after the Easter bombings. During the shootout many extremists connected to Zaharan committed suicide while others were killed by security forces. Digital examination of the sim card by a foreign intelligence bureau linked it to a phone number, and the CID arrested a military person. The DMI Director intervened and took him away, claiming he was "our man." The matter was raised in Parliament by MP Manusha Nanayakkara. (The Hansard, Vol. 282, Chapter 12, p. 1678) Neither the DMI nor any other agency has denied the story.

The incident was narrated to the COI by former Director CID, SSP Shani Abeysekara, while MP Harin Fernando also spoke of it in Parliament.

MP Fernando said: "This is evidence given before the Commission, but it has not come into the report. I state this with a sense of responsibility, Hon. Deputy Speaker. And so, I ask you to request that all evidence given before the Commission be made known to the public." (The Hansard, 20 April 2021, Vol. 282, Chapter 12, p. 1663).

Now the Director CID, SSP Shani Abeysekara has confirmed the story in detail in his FR petition filed.



“The CID officers became aware through the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about an Internet Protocol (IP) address belonging to an individual who had been in frequent communication with Saharan which was discovered by analysing computers, mobile devices and internet accounts tied to Easter attackers. When the CID began interrogating the said individual who refused to give any information about his connection to Saharan or to NTJ. Thereafter, the Ministry of Defence through the then DMI Director Brigadier Chula Kodithuwakku prevented the CID from detaining the said individual asserting that that the activities of the said individual were classified as national security reasons as his activities were part of a secret military intelligence operation.”

Why was the CID not allowed to question this man? What did they mean by “our man?” Is it an indication that even during the Easter attack, military intelligence had contacts with extremists?

Hadiya’s Sound Clip on Military Intelligence Officer MP Fernando also informed Parliament that audio clips of Zaharan’s wife Hadiya admitting her husband met intelligence offices are available.

“The Clips where Hadiya, the wife of Zahran admitting that her husband had met intelligence officers prior to the Easter Sunday attacks are available and Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, (head of the Catholic Church, Colombo) and those in the Vatican had already seen it, I will not reveal as to where it is now because of security reasons.”¹⁶

Neither the Cardinal nor the government spokesperson has rejected this story.

Deep state

Investigations into the Easter attacks have brought up more questions than answers.

Involvement or connections of DMI and SIS with Islamic extremists and clear attempts to cover up of acts by Zaharan and his associates are troubling issues.

Dappula de Livera, former Attorney General revealed just prior to his retirement that there was a ‘grand conspiracy’ behind the Easter attack. As AG, he had access to all 22 volumes of the COI report¹⁷. However, he has not been questioned by investigators as to how he reached this conclusion.

“The PSC also observed that further investigations will be needed to understand whether those with vested interests did not act on intelligence to create chaos and instil fear and uncertainty in the country in the lead up to the Presidential Election to be held later in the year. Such a situation would then lead to the call for a change of regime to contain such acts of terrorism. Coincidentally or not so coincidentally, the security situation and fear would be unleashed months away from the Presidential Election.” (PSC Page 05)

Within days of the attack, former Defence secretary and presidential candidate of the Sirisena- Rajapaksa camp returned to Sri Lanka from the States and seven days after the attack proclaimed his candidacy. “Gotabaya Rajapaksa, said on Friday [28 April 2019] he would run for president in elections this year and would stop the spread of Islamist extremism by rebuilding the intelligence service and surveillance of citizens.”¹⁸

“The CID officers became aware through the FBI about an Internet Protocol (IP) address belonging to an individual who had been in frequent communication with Zaharan. When the CID began interrogating the said individual the Ministry of Defence prevented the CID from detaining him asserting that that the activities of the said individual were classified as national security. The question is as he has been in contact with Zaharan did, he know the impending attacks? Why was he shielded?”

CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE



Commemoration on 21 April 2020 (Photo credit: Melani Manel Perera)

For nearly three years, the Catholic Church has been calling for justice for the Easter Sunday victims, through media briefings, demonstrations, and prayer vigils.

The main demand is that the recommendations of the COI be implemented, and the mastermind named. In a letter addressed to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July 2021, the Catholic Bishops Conference, Sri Lanka, posed several questions and requested a response within a month.

“Finally, we wish to inform Your Excellency, that if truth and justice cannot be assured in a satisfactory manner in this matter by the Government and this issue is dealt with rather superficially, we will be forced to agitate for such through alternative means”.

It further said that “If the masterminds behind the Easter attacks and those who helped them by neglecting their duties and avoided taking suitable action to prevent these would be freed of their culpability, the whole question of justice would be forever swept under the carpet. If that happens it would not only be tantamount to a serious crime of the denial of justice to the 269 innocents who were assassinated in these murderous attacks, to all those relatives of the victims who have been aggrieved by their deaths and to those thousands who have been rendered destitute by reason of their injuries, but it would also constitute a grave threat to national security.

“Hence, it is our firm belief that the legal proceedings concerning these Easter terror attacks should end only with the prosecution of all those who were directly involved and all those who assisted them at their behest, all those masterminds who planned these attacks and those who led these attacks, and all those political leaders, State Officials, Police and Intelligence Service Officials who, in spite of being able to prevent these massacres, neglected to do so.

Similarly, we believe that it should end only by conducting a serious investigation on this which would answer the following key questions:

Was there a conspiracy behind these attacks?

What were the aims of these attacks?

Who were those connected to these attacks?

The results of these investigations should then be made known to the public.



We hope that your government would take stock of the present lethargic and slow-moving approach to investigations which seems to reveal a conspiracy to protect certain individuals and to prevent the truth from emerging and to take quick action to unravel all the causes of this massacre, thus ensuring justice to those affected as soon as possible. Only that will prove to us that you stand for truth and justice and the protection of the rule of law and not for political gain. We urge Your Excellency to listen to our appeal and to investigate soon all these above-mentioned factors and reveal to the nation their verity.”¹⁹

Justice for Muslim victims

Following the Easter attacks, thousands of Muslims were harassed by extremist Sinhala mobs.

While the Catholic Church moved quickly to prevent retaliatory attacks in and around the places where the bombings occurred, anti-Muslim violence spread elsewhere, fuelled by extreme Sinhala Buddhist rhetoric, fake news, and the tacit support of the police.

Even three weeks after the bombings, Sinhala mobs nearing 2000 were burning Muslim owned shops and houses in Minuwangoda town. (COI Page 388) COI records 100s of such attacks in the North-western Province. (Page 391-395)

In the nearly three years since the bombings, the State has failed to prosecute the actual perpetrators. Rather, it has used the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979 (PTA) as a tool to persecute the Muslim minority.²⁰

Nor have anti-Muslim rioters been brought to justice; they enjoy complete impunity. Though the COI has recommended that the Sinhala Ravaya, Mahsohon Balakaya, Sinhala Jathijka Balamaluwa, Sinhala Jathika Sanvidanaya and the Siva Sena Movement be closely monitored, and legal action be taken against any hint of extremism, no action has yet been taken.

The European Parliament resolution dated June 10, 2021, called for a “rigorous, impartial and complete investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in line with international legal standards”. It also calls for “those against whom there is evidence of culpability to be promptly brought to trial, and for those for whom there is insufficient evidence to be released.”²¹

In a recent statement, Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, stated they will reach out to the international community, including the United Nations, to seek justice for the bombings. “We would also try to influence some pertinent and powerful countries that are in contact with the church,” he further said.²²

“In the nearly three years since the bombings, the State has failed to prosecute the actual perpetrators. Rather, it has used the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979 (PTA) as a tool to persecute the Muslim minority.”

INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT OF THOSE CALLING FOR JUSTICE



Justice activist Shehan Malaka was questioned for 7 days and later detained and given bail.

Instead of engaging with those campaigning for justice and addressing concerns, the State has adopted a policy of intimidation and harassment.

Shehan Malaka Gamage, a well-known activist campaigning for justice for Easter Sunday victims, was arrested in an abduction style operation on February 14, 2022, and given bail the next day. The Cardinal blamed the Attorney General for acting according to whims and fancies of politicians in ordering the arrest.²³ In June 2021 too, the CID questioned Gamage for seven days over a statement he made on the bombings. A layman who has endorsed the views expressed by Fr. Cyril Gamini, the Cardinal's spokesperson, on the attacks was called to CID for questioning on February 6, 2022.²⁴



Fr. Cyril Gamini as the spokesperson of the catholic church had to face continuous harassment.

Fr. Cyril Gamini himself was summoned by the CID on November 15, 2021 and questioned for seven hours over a statement he made regarding the bombings. The two days of questioning followed a complaint lodged by current SIS Head, Major General Suresh Salley.²⁵

On September 27, 2021, catholic churches in Weligampitiya, Wattala, Hunupitiya, and Ragama areas in the Western Province were informed by officers of the Welisara Naval Base, of a possible attack within the course of the next day. According to the Navy, the attack would be carried out by a person

dressed as a Catholic priest. Later, the Navy and the Defence Ministry claimed it was a mistake, and that it was part of a security plan.

Though the Church called for a full investigation on this “fake threat” it was not investigated.

The thousandth day since the Easter bombings was marked with a service at the Tewatte Basilica in Ragama, on January 14th. Two days before the service, news broke out that a hand grenade had been found at All Saints Church, Borella. Within hours they had arrested the Sacristan of the Church. Sarath Weerasekera, the Minister of Public Security, was at pains to tell the public that the Sacristan, Muni, was a Tamil. Same as the man, he said, who allegedly planted a grenade at the Lanka Hospital, sometime last year.²⁶ But the allegation of the Minister proved completely wrong within days.²⁷

Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thera meanwhile, made a sarcastic comment about the Cardinal questioning the police investigation into the Borella church incident. He said the President should appoint Cardinal Ranjith the IGP.²⁸

Earlier, this ultra-Sinhala nationalist monk berated the Cardinal, stating he was ‘not’ a King, and that had he been this keen about catholic issues in the past, the Easter attacks may never have occurred.²⁹

But the Church had not been informed about any such attack.³⁰ The monk enjoys complete immunity, despite the false, humiliating, and threatening remarks he makes against other religious communities.

END NOTE

It is crystal clear that there are many unanswered questioned and deliberate cover ups in relation to Easter Sunday Attacks in Sri Lanka. There is also a concerted campaign to silence the campaign for justice.

The important missing link is the deleted data in the smart phone of then SIS Director, Jayawardena. Today he is the DIG for the multi -ethnic Central Province.

Both the COI and PSC have concluded that former President Sirisena had been informed of the impending attack. His unscheduled visit to Singapore, not appointing an Acting Defence Minister in his absence, and blocking the national security meeting scheduled in the aftermath of the attack, must be probed.

The full report of the COI alone with all other reports of Easter Sunday Investigations should be make public so that all viewpoints and facts will be known.

The role played by Bodu Bala Sena and its leader Gnanasara Thero in causing anti-Muslim riots, President Sirisena pardoning him while serving a 4- year prison sentence, President Rajapaksa making him chairperson of One Country One Law Task force and his continuous attacks on those campaigning for justice for the Easter carnage must be addressed seriously.

It is impossible to expect the Sri Lankan government to conduct a transparent and independent investigation into the Easter Sunday Attacks. Only an investigation in collaboration with a credible international institution will be able to unearth the involvement of the Deep State and the motive for the attacks.

Serious questions also remain regarding military intelligence and political leadership.

These are the central issues the international human rights community must address. Lack of Accountability and Justice are recurring themes in Sri Lanka. What is needed today is a holistic approach not a fragmented one.



The banner: Who is the real mastermind of the attack? (Photo credit: Melani Manel Perera)

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On 21 April 2021 clergy and people gathered to commemorate of the Easter Sunday attack and victims. Roughly translated placards say “Easter Sunday Attack is an organised murder. Will the law be applied to those who were directly involved and those who deliberately elude their responsibility in the murder? Implement the Justice Now!”